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INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission (the
“FCC” or “Commission”) handed down a decision to relax its
1
broadcast ownership rules in a 3-2 vote along party lines. This
rulemaking will likely be remembered as among the most
2
controversial in Commission history. Perhaps the most contentious
rule approved in this vote was a ten percent increase in the national
3
Under this new limit, a
ownership cap of broadcast stations.
company may own television stations that, in the aggregate, reach up
4
to forty-five percent of the country’s television households.
Concerned about the public outcry against the new broadcast rules
and subsequent litigation efforts to put a stop to their
implementation, Congress passed a new, thirty-nine percent national
5
ownership limit within its next Appropriations Act. On January 22,
6
2004, President George W. Bush signed this bill into law.
1. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003,
at A1 (reporting that the new broadcast rules were contentious, and support for
them was split along party lines, with the Republicans following the lead of Chairman
Michael Powell).
2. See Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Media Concentration Bench Remarks
(June 2, 2003), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC235047A5.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that the
Commission received over three quarters of a million comments on its proposed
broadcast rules in advance of the June 2, 2003 vote, more than for any other
proceeding in Commission history). The Commissioner further discusses the many
public hearings he attended across the country, along with Commissioner Adelstein,
in which Americans from across the political spectrum were opposed to the
proposed broadcast rules.
3. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Sure-fire Recipe for Trouble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 23, 2003, at 52 (warning the public about the unprecedented media
consolidation that will result from lifting the ownership cap from thirty-five percent
to forty-five percent); COMMUNICATIONS DAILY (Warren Communications News,
Wash., D.C.), June 3, 2003, at 1 (noting that the opposition to changes in the
broadcast ownership rules by various organizations and Congress focused primarily
on the increased ownership cap).
4. Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and
Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,327-28 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership
Rules].
5. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, 118 Stat. 3
(amending the 1996 Telecommunications Act by striking “thirty-five percent” and
replacing it with “thirty-nine percent”).
6. See Additional Comment Sought on UHF Television Discount, 69 Fed. Reg.
9216, 9216 (Feb. 27, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 UHF Discount Comment Request]
(detailing the steps taken to change the national ownership cap to thirty-nine
percent and calling for comments on eliminating the UHF discount). The passage
of the Appropriations Act raising the ownership cap to thirty-nine percent prompted
the Commission to reconsider maintaining the UHF discount, and the agency has
taken comments on whether or not to keep this rule. Id. However, the Commission
is considering only whether or not the language of the Appropriations Act signifies
“approval, adoption, or ratification” of the UHF discount. Id.
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The FCC calculates national ownership for broadcast companies by
counting the number of households that receive a particular station
7
against the number of households that receive television nationwide.
In this calculation, the FCC takes into account whether a station is on
the Very-High Frequency (“VHF”) band, 86-408 MHz (channels 213), or the Ultra-High Frequency (“UHF”) band, 480-920 MHz
8
(channels 14-83).
The Commission considers this frequency
9
distinction pursuant to a provision called the UHF discount. The
UHF discount requires the FCC to attribute a UHF station with fifty
percent of the nationwide reach of a VHF station when calculating a
10
broadcast owner’s national ownership percentage. The Commission
created the UHF discount provision in the 1980s to help struggling
11
stations on the UHF band.
Over the past eighteen years, the Commission has transformed
UHF television into a success story with regulatory assistance
12
measures like the UHF discount. Over the same period of time,
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2)(i) (2003) (defining national audience reach as
“the total number of television households in the Nielsen Designated Market Areas
(DMAs) in which the relevant stations are located divided by the total national
television households as measured by DMA data at the time of a grant, transfer, or
assignment of a license”).
8. Id. (explaining that for purposes of making a national ownership calculation,
“UHF television stations shall be attributed with 50 percent of the television
households in their DMA market”). See generally The Darkened Channels: UHF
Television and the FCC, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1578-79 (1962) (examining the
thirteen-year history of the Commission’s system of channel allocation).
9. See In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35,
73.240 and 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of
AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum, Opinion, and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 74, ¶ 42 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order];
Mark K. Miller & Dan Trigoboff, Calm Before the Storm, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 7,
2003, at http://www.broadcastingcable.com (on file with the American University
Law Review) (explaining that the FCC method for calculating reach assumes that
VHF stations (channels 2-13) reach every home in the market, but UHF stations
(channels 14-83) reach only half as many homes). The article further notes that the
FCC does not count the reach of any group’s second stations in a market when
calculating national ownership levels. Id.
10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2)(i); see Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (noting that
the FCC calculates national ownership by assessing the percentage of the 106.7
million homes with television sets that each broadcast company reaches with their
various stations).
11. The Commission created the UHF discount of the National Broadcast
Ownership Rule as a revision of a 1984 rulemaking on media ownership issues. 1985
Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1-44. The UHF discount was
a direct response to various petitions sent to the Commission during the rulemaking
arguing that the FCC should give UHF stations special treatment that would account
for the technical handicap between the signals and create incentives for companies
and networks to purchase them. Id. For a more detailed discussion on the history of
the UHF discount, see infra Part II.C.
12. See In the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, ¶¶ 18-24 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order] (finding that, in 1995, there
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however, technological advancements, the evolution of viewer
behavior, and market realities have created a world in which the
13
UHF/VHF distinction no longer exists. In fact, the Commission
itself has gathered sufficient findings showing the robust health of
UHF television to eliminate every other regulatory assistance measure
14
supporting UHF. Keeping the UHF discount in the face of these
findings contravenes a clear congressional mandate to eliminate
broadcast rules that are no longer necessary in the public interest as a
15
result of competition.
Today, the UHF discount is anathema to a healthy media
marketplace because it effectively raises the national ownership limit
16
for companies choosing to acquire UHF television stations. This
provision encourages greater media concentration by authorizing
some of the largest media companies to exceed the national
17
ownership limits imposed by the Commission.
This kind of
were more UHF television stations than VHF stations, and that the band grew by
235% between 1971 and 1994).
13. See infra Part III.A (discussing the technological improvements to UHF
television).
14. See infra Part III.B (discussing the analytical inconsistency of the
Commission’s decisions to repeal all regulatory measures assisting UHF television
except for the UHF discount). See, e.g., In the Matter of Policies Regarding
Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, Report
and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, ¶¶ 1-26, 31 (1998) [hereinafter 1988 Detrimental Effects
Order] (eliminating the UHF Impact Policy and finding that UHF service had
achieved enough comparability with the VHF service so as to repeal this assistance
measure for fear that it may harm VHF stations if continued); In re Review of the
Prime Time Access Rule, Section 73.658(k) of the Commission’s Rules, MM Docket
No. 94-123, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, ¶¶ 1-4, 64-86 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 PTAR Order]
(repealing the Prime Time Access Rule (“PTAR”), reasoning that UHF television had
become so viable that is was attracting network affiliation on its own, and no longer
required this regulatory assistance measure); 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order,
supra note 12, ¶ 4 (repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule based on the technical
advancements to UHF television and the Commission’s findings that these stations
had become financially successful).
15. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56,
111-12 (2003). Legislative history and the courts have interpreted Section 202(h) as
carrying with it a presumption toward changing rules biennially. See, e.g., Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sinclair
Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The Commission has also
acknowledged this presumption toward change. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review
Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287 (acknowledging the decisions in Fox
Television and Sinclair in which the court found this presumption toward change).
Furthermore, Congress has directed the Commission to issue a report including “full
justification” for retaining any broadcast rules under its biennial review. See H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148 (1999). The Commission failed to do this when it
most recently chose to maintain the UHF discount. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review
Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,328.
16. See infra Part III.C (discussing media concentration, the UHF discount, and
how this provision further discourages smaller competitors from entering the
broadcast market).
17. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (stating that the UHF discount allows a
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concentration poses a direct threat to the basic public interest tenets
of American broadcast regulation; competition, localism, and
18
diversity.
This Comment argues that the Commission should eliminate or
promptly phase out the UHF discount because it is contrary to the
public interest. Part I describes the role of the public interest in
communication law and especially in broadcast. Part II outlines the
history of UHF stations and their role in the television broadcast
industry. It also discusses the FCC and its efforts to foster the growth
of UHF. Part III argues that advances in technology and changes in
both viewer behavior and market realities have bridged the gap
between UHF and VHF. Next, Part III highlights a line of FCC
decisions repealing every other regulatory measure created to assist
UHF based on findings showing the viability of UHF television. This
Section argues that it is inconsistent to maintain the UHF discount in
light of these findings. Finally, Part III asserts that the UHF discount
encourages media concentration and argues that this phenomenon
harms the public interest in broadcast. This Section also proposes
some practical solutions for eliminating the UHF discount.
I.

THE FCC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The FCC’s obligation to act in the public interest dates back
further than the Commission itself. The Federal Radio Act of 1927
was passed under the premise that the right of the public to receive
19
communications services is superior to the right of any individual.
The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal
Communications Commission and authorized it to grant licenses that

company to own two UHF stations for every one VHF station under the national
ownership limits). The clearest way to understand the effect of this rule is to
calculate national ownership for the top media companies without the discount. Id.
Thus, Paxson would reach 61.8% of U.S. homes, Viacom 44.8%, Fox 44.4%,
Univision 41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%, thereby allowing six of the top
media markets to operate above the thirty-five percent national ownership limits. Id.
18. See infra Part III.C. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202
(amending broadcast regulations while maintaining the public interest standard);
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307-308 (2003) (giving the
Commission broad authority to make rules and grant licenses that serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity).
19. Radio Act of 1927 § 4, 69 Pub. L. No, 632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927)
(establishing the Federal Radio Commission, which allocates frequencies among
applicants in a manner responsive to “public convenience, interest, or necessity”); see
also 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (statement of Sen. White) (asserting that the Radio
Act of 1927 provides a fundamental shift in communications law from allowing
anyone to “transmit what they will” to the doctrine that “the right of the public
interest to service is superior to the right of any individual”).
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serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.” In addition,
Section 303(r) of the Communications Act provides that:
The Commission from time to time, as public convenience,
interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . [make] such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not

inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the
21
provisions of [the Act].
The Commission has broad authority to regulate the broadcast
22
industry according to this standard. The FCC has long interpreted
the public interest in broadcast to be that which fosters diversity,
23
The primary theory
localism, and competition on the airwaves.
underlying the Commission’s emphasis on diversity is that having the
greatest possible number of owners in the mass media market
promotes a variety of viewpoints and prevents the undue
24
concentration of economic power.
Localism is a longstanding
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-308; see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436
U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (“[The] avowed claim of the Communications Act of 1934 was
to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.”)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r).
22. See id. § 151 (stating the purpose of the Federal Communications
Commission); id. § 303 (granting the Commission broad authority to regulate the
broadcast industry according to the public interest, convenience, and necessity); id. §
301 (authorizing the Commission to grant and revoke licenses in broadcast
according to the public interest, convenience, and necessity).
23. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,28788 (identifying diversity, competition, and localism as longstanding goals that would
continue to be core agency objectives in broadcast). The Commission’s commitment
to localism, diversity, and competition were evident long before these principals were
articulated in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 or the 2003 Broadcast
Rulemaking. See In the Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Television
Tables of Assignments and to Add New VHF Stations in the Top 100 Markets and to
Assure that the New Stations Maximize Diversity of Ownership, Control, and
Programming, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 840, ¶¶ 21-24 (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Television Assignment Order] (revealing that the Commission
allocated the first intermixed set of television stations according to five priorities
demonstrating its desire to provide nationwide access to television, as well as
competition and a diversity of viewpoints wherever possible); see also Nat’l Citizens
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 781 (explaining that the FCC has considered a diversity
in control of the media as “‘a factor of primary significance’” in determining who
should receive the initial license for a broadcast facility among competing applicants
in a comparative proceeding); ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
TELEVISION REGULATION 100-04 (1973) (illustrating that the Commission’s
commitment to localism in television was most clearly demonstrated through its
decision to use the still-experimental UHF band to expand television service). Noll
also cites the role of the localism doctrine in regulations governing group ownership
and cross-media ownership. Id. at 104-08. Noll suggests that the Commission chose
to increase the number of television stations by using the UHF band because these
stations and their lower-powered signals would remain local. Id. at 101-04.
24. See In the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,751, 65,756 (Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial
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objective for broadcast, and is based on the Commission’s vision for
television in which station owners, who are part of the community,
serve their audiences with original content, produced by and for the
25
community. The third broadcast tenet has its roots in the principal
that greater competition among television owners will produce better
service for consumers. This became a major goal for the Commission
26
through the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 modernized the 1934
Communications Act by taking into account changes in technology
27
and the dramatic increase in the variety of media sources. With
passage of this law, Congress lifted the national ownership cap and
28
eased other media cross-ownership restrictions. Nevertheless, the
Broadcast Review NPRM] (“The Commission has considered four aspects of diversity:
viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity.”); see also
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (asserting that
greater diversity eliminates the ability of one person or group to exert “an inordinate
effect, in political, editorial, or similar programming sense, [or] on public opinion at
the regional level”) (internal quotations omitted).
25. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760 (“[A]
primary objective and benefit of our nation’s system of regulation of broadcast
television is the local origination of programming.”) (quoting congressional findings
and policy pursuant to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, which would require cable operators
to carry no less than a fixed number of local television stations in each market). For
a detailed discussion of localism, see infra Part III.C.
26. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,291
(noting the Commission’s duty, from the Communications Act of 1934, to serve the
public interest by ensuring open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities);
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (2003)
(mandating that the Commission review its rules biennially and determine whether
any of such rules are “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition”).
Competition became of primary importance under the 1996 Act because its focus
was largely on deregulation. Id. The Act raised the national ownership limit to
thirty-five percent and forced the Commission to reevaluate its rules biennially to
foster competition. Id.
27. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 (adding provisions for the regulation of
new technology and relaxing media ownership restrictions). While the 1996 Act was
conceived to deregulate telecommunications markets to a large extent, it does not
lose sight of the Commission’s duty to regulate communications services in the
public interest. See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 16 (1995) (“[T]he purpose for the bill is to
increase competition in all telecommunications markets and provide for an orderly
transition from regulated markets to competitive and deregulated
telecommunications markets consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.”); see also Judith C. Aarons, Note, Cross-Ownership’s Last Stand? The Federal
Communications Commission’s Proposal Concerning the Repeal of the Newspaper/Broadcast
Cross-Ownership Rule, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 317, 329-30 (2002)
(stating that the new Act aimed to increase competition and encourage deregulation
based on changes in technology and new media sources).
28. See Telecommunications Act § 202(h) (authorizing the FCC to eliminate the
cap on the number of television stations any one entity may own, while increasing
the national ownership cap to thirty-five percent from twenty-five percent). The Act
also repealed the telephone/cable and cable/broadcast cross-ownership rules, lifted
remaining limits on cable/network cross-ownership, eliminated national and local
caps on radio ownership, and eased the dual-network rule. Id.
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1996 Telecommunications Act maintained the public interest focus
of the 1934 Act by stating that “the Commission shall seek to promote
the policies and purposes of this Act favoring diversity of media
voices, vigorous economic competition, technical advancement and
29
the promotion of the public interest, convenience and necessity.”
Thus, Congress mandated that the Commission continue to regulate
broadcast television according to the same principals that guided it at
its inception, despite the overwhelming growth in the number and
30
types of media in this country over the past eighty years.
II. UHF TELEVISION: THE LONG ROAD TO SUCCESS
A. The History of UHF
In 1945, the FCC began allocating television stations to the
31
country’s 140 largest markets, using channels on the VHF band. By
1948, the television phenomenon had reached a competitive high
32
point, and the VHF band was saturated. Across the country, stations
were suffering from overwhelming interference problems from this
33
surge in station assignments. The allotment of VHF stations had
run its course, and there were no channels left for television
34
stations. The FCC subsequently put all pending applications for
new television licenses on hold in a four-year “television freeze” while
35
it searched for a solution to these problems. The public wanted
29. Id. § 257(b).
30. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(“In the context of the regulation of broadcasting, the ‘public interest’ has
historically embraced diversity (as well as localism) . . . and nothing in § 202(h)
signals a departure from that historic scope.”) (internal citations omitted).
31. See The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining that the FCC
distributed the broadcast licenses in order to foster fair and efficient television
service).
32. See CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KITTROSS, STAY TUNED: A CONCISE
HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 295-99 (1978) (describing how the popularity of
television transformed itself into a nationwide phenomenon); HUGH R. SLOTTEN,
RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCASTING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1920-1960 166 (2000) (recounting that manufacturers had been able to sell
only 14,000 television sets in 1947, but sold 172,000 the very next year).
33. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 295 (stating that by 1948, the
Commission was fighting a losing battle by trying to provide each community with
their own television stations on the VHF band). Mutual interference between station
signals in neighboring cities, such as Detroit and Cleveland, was making reception
impossible in each. Id.
34. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 21-24 (noting that
the Commission froze the applications for television stations while it looked for a
solution to interference problems on the VHF band).
35. Id.; see also STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 295-96 (reporting that
several hearings took place during the time of the “freeze” involving five main
television issues: “(1) color television standards, (2) reduction of tropospeheric
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more options on television, and the Commission was tasked with
providing an environment where competition, localism, and diversity
36
Ultimately, after much debate, the Commission
could flourish.
chose to create more stations by using the still-experimental UHF
37
band. This expansion allowed more spacing between stations on
the VHF band, and therefore less interference, while giving viewers
38
more options on television. Adding UHF stations to the broadcast
lineup provided more communities with their own stations, satisfying
the Commission’s tripartite goal of encouraging competition,
39
localism, and diversity.
In 1952, with the Sixth Report and Order on this matter, the FCC
lifted the “television freeze” order and proceeded to allocate seventy

interference, (3) possible spectrum locations for additional channels, (4) city-by-city
assignment of channels and criteria for these assignments, and (5) educational
television channel reservations”).
36. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 299 (noting that finding more
channels for the television industry was the only way the Commission could provide
for a competitive nationwide television system). When the Commission finally
created more television stations in 1952, its allocation decisions were based on five
priorities that underscored the Commission’s concern with distributing television
stations widely to create nationwide access and its attempt to provide the most
diverse, competitive environment possible. See 1977 Television Assignment Order,
supra note 23, ¶ 24. The priorities were, first, “to provide at least one television
service to all parts of the United States”; second, “to provide each community with at
least one television station”; third, “to provide a choice of at least two television
services to all parts of the United States”; fourth, “to provide each community with at
least two television stations”; and fifth, “any channels remaining unassigned under
these priorities would be assigned . . . on the basis of the size of the population of the
city, geographic location, and the number of TV services available from stations in
other communities.” Id. ¶ 25.
37. See generally id. ¶¶ 23-25 (reciting history of UHF television); Notice of
Inquiry, In the Matter of Improvements to UHF Television Reception, 70 F.C.C.2d
1162, ¶¶ 5-7 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI]
(discussing long-term struggles facing UHF television in its earliest years); NOLL ET
AL., supra note 23, at 100-04 (explaining the various failures of the UHF band when it
began in 1954).
38. One proposed allocation plan at this time involved sacrificing some local
stations to build regional stations that would carry network programming. The
Commission rejected this plan in favor of finding ways to create as many local
television stations as possible, and hence, eventually decided to explore the use of
the UHF band rather than creating a fourth network. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23,
at 101 (stating that one proposed allocation plan at this time involved sacrificing
some local stations to build regional stations that would carry network
programming).
39. See id. at 5 (explaining the Commission’s view that “as many communities as
possible should have the opportunity [to enjoy] the advantages that derive from
having local outlets that will be responsive to local needs”) (citing Sixth Report and
Order, In the Matters of Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commissions’ Rules
and Regulations; Amendment of the Commission’s Rules, Regulations and
Engineering Standards Concerning the Television Broadcast Service, Utilization of
Frequencies in the Band 470 to 890 Mcs. for Television Broadcasting, 41 F.C.C. 148,
¶ 79 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 Sixth Report and Order]).
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40

UHF channels to broadcast television. Initially, this solution had few
41
allies. The primary criticism of using UHF to create more television
42
stations was that its signal had substantial technical limitations. For
example, a typical VHF station provides reliable reception in an area
up to sixty-five to seventy miles, while UHF stations, at that time,
43
reached only thirty to forty miles. A new UHF station also faced the
obstacle of American households, the vast majority of which had
44
television sets capable of receiving only the VHF signal.
Another major criticism of the Sixth Report and Order was the
Commission’s plan to “intermix” both VHF and UHF stations in the
45
same markets. Instead of allowing stations within a community to
40. 1952 Sixth Report and Order, supra note 39, ¶ 79 (revising the 1948 “freeze
order,” which provided that “no new or pending applications for the construction of
new television broadcast stations would be acted upon by the Commission”); see also
1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶ 24 (noting that the Sixth Report
and Order of 1952 established the television system in place today, which began with
twelve VHF and seventy UHF channels); The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1579
(remarking that “[o]ver two thousand channel assignments were reserved for more
than 1200 communities; [and that] 252 channels were reserved for educational
use”). In total, the allocated UHF channels, 14-83, provided 1,433 additional station
assignments. NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 4 (highlighting alterations that were
made to this allocation plan in 1966).
41. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 299 (reporting that “even those in
favor of greater access were not in favor of starting the untried UHF band”).
42. See generally In the Matter of Improvements to UHF Television Reception,
Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 1121, ¶¶ 1-5, 20-27 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 UHF
Development Policy Order] (reporting that the UHF signal has historically suffered
from particular challenges, such as a weaker signal, poor signal and picture
reception, and much higher operating costs than VHF stations because of the higher
power levels that UHF requires). The Report also states findings from the efforts by
the FCC to aid UHF stations and foster their growth. Id. See generally BRUCE M. OWEN
ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 122 (1984) (citing tuning difficulties and technical
limitations as two major obstacles to the success of UHF televisions stations).
43. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 324 (stating that a lower-frequency
station, and thus a lower-numbered channel, provides better service than a highernumbered channel because the signal of the lower-frequency will travel further).
44. See id. at 299 (citing receiver conversion problems as the primary technical
obstacle facing potential UHF stations at that time); NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at
102 (stating that UHF tuning was more difficult because it had poorer signals as
compared with VHF stations).
45. The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1579-80 (reporting strong opposition
to intermixture by CBS and DuMont networks, as well as television manufacturers).
The Commission initially chose to intermix UHF and VHF television in every market
for two reasons: an all VHF market might restrict service in larger cities because of
interference problems on the VHF band, while all-UHF communities would be
deprived of the wider-reaching VHF service. See In The Matter of Table of Television
Allotments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 F.C.C.2d 51, ¶ 22 (1980)
[hereinafter 1980 TV Allotments NPRM]. It is interesting to note that the
President’s Communications Policy Board Report of 1961 warned that intermixture
would likely harm UHF stations for a considerable period of time because the
technical differences of these two signals meant that UHF stations could not be
comparable to VHF stations. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 302-03. This
report also acknowledged the early-comer status of VHF stations would mean that
audiences would be unlikely to purchase additional receivers just to watch the newer
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compete with others on the same frequency band, critics argued, the
Commission sabotaged UHF stations by forcing them to compete
46
with stations on the technically superior VHF band. DuMont, the
fourth major network at the time, set forth the following arguments
against intermixture:
(1) UHF transmitting equipment was inferior to available VHF
equipment in power and efficiency;
(2) large established VHF audiences would be withheld from UHF
stations because of the need to buy adapters and in many cases to
erect new receiving antennas for UHF;
(3) UHF was not received as well in built-up or rough-terrain areas;
(4) in large metropolitan markets, advertisers would prefer VHF
stations with established receiver audiences and would prefer
47
networks with VHF affiliates.

Nevertheless, the FCC chose to support the “fiction of equivalence”
48
of VHF and UHF.
They believed both that technology would
49
improve and that viewer behavior would easily change. It did not
take long for the critics to prove UHF proponents wrong. Almost as
50
soon as UHF stations began airing, most went dark. In 1954, there
were 121 UHF stations, over one-third of the total television stations
51
52
on the air. By 1960, forty-six of these had gone off the air. All told,
UHF stations. Id.
46. See 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37, ¶ 7 (explaining
that when UHF television began in 1952, it was competing with 108 well-established
VHF stations, reaching two-thirds of nationwide households, as well as a majority of
homes equipped with television sets that received only VHF television); see also
STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 302-03 (illustrating how the critics’
predictions came true, with hundreds of UHF stations shutting down due to their
inability to compete with the superior VHF stations).
47. The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1580 (internal citations omitted).
48. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 303.
49. 1952 Sixth Report and Order, supra note 39, ¶ 197.
[W]e are convinced that the UHF band will be fully utilized and that UHF
stations will eventually compete on a favorable basis with stations in the
VHF . . . .
We are persuaded that the differences in propagation
characteristics will not prevent UHF stations from becoming an integral part
of a single service . . . . Further, there is no reason to believe that American
science will not produce the equipment necessary for the fullest
development of UHF.
Id.
50. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 356. Those who argued that
intermixture would destroy UHF stations were proven right almost as soon as these
stations went on the air. Despite the Commission’s attempt to bring in viable
competition to VHF stations, the intermixture plan created undeniable inequalities
because of the status of the technology and viewer behavior at that time. See id.
(stating that the large amount of VHF-only televisions put UHF at a serious
disadvantage).
51. Id. at 102.
52. Id.
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nearly fifty-five percent of the 165 stations that went on the air
53
UHF operators were
between 1952 and 1959 eventually failed.
battling all of the initial technical inequalities and discovering new
54
difficulties along the way.
Audiences were reluctant to start watching the new UHF stations,
partly due to custom and partly because they found the quality of
programming poor compared to the already-established VHF
55
stations. Television manufacturers were slow to produce UHF-VHF
compatible sets, and they justified their foot-dragging by citing
negligible demand for such sets, despite the fact that they had
56
pledged to manufacture them. Also, in an attempt to encourage
localism, the FCC only authorized UHF stations to operate with
57
enough power to serve small areas. Regardless of this restriction,
the technical limitations of the UHF signal, coupled with the
inferiority of early transmitters and receivers, meant that it was
difficult to receive a good UHF picture more than a few miles away
58
from the transmitter.
This was true even if UHF stations were
59
allowed to use several times more power than a VHF station.
Advertisers were turned off by UHF stations’ small audiences, and
many UHF station owners could not find a way to earn back the
hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars they spent launching
60
their new stations.
In addition, few networks were interested in
53. See id. at 357 (citing these figures as evidence of the seriousness of the plight
of UHF stations and noting that the FCC’s first priority was to meet the needs of the
television-hungry public by processing station applications).
54. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 25 (explaining the
Commission’s assessment of the factors hindering UHF television in 1956, including
the abundance of VHF-only television sets in homes; the performance deficiencies of
UHF transmitters and receivers; and the resulting preference of program and
money-making sources for VHF stations). The Commission also concluded that
because most UHF stations could not attract an audience comparable to their
competitors on the VHF band, they were forced to operate on a marginal basis or
cease operating altogether. Id.
55. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 103 (noting some of the difficulties that
UHF television faced at the outset, such as the fact that most television sets were built
for VHF reception only, that UHF tuning was more difficult, and its signals were
poorer).
56. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 356 (reporting that the production
of all-channels sets peaked at thirty-five percent in early 1953 and dropped below
nine percent by 1958). The absence of demand for all-channel sets gave
manufacturers little incentive to produce sets with more features. Id.
57. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23 (noting that the limitation placed on
UHF stations with respect to their operating power was exacerbated by the existing
technical handicap of poor signal quality, as well as viewers’ preference for preexisting VHF stations).
58. NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 103.
59. Id.
60. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 325 (noting that the first owners of
UHF stations invested upwards of hundreds of thousands of dollars, only to find that
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affiliating with UHF stations, and many of those who did so out of
necessity changed their affiliation once the first VHF station
61
appeared in the community. Independent UHF stations could not
take advantage of the economies of scale and the large audiences that
their VHF counterparts had, and therefore, could not afford to air
62
attractive programs. Soon, UHF stations found themselves suffering
from a vicious cycle of problems that managed to keep them in
virtual ruin until the FCC focused its efforts on fostering their
63
success.
B. Cleaning Up the UHF Mess
Reversing the overwhelming failure of UHF stations during their
first ten years of existence required creative thinking. These stations
had to overcome technical inequalities; market intermixture with
technically superior and vastly-favored VHF stations; and lack of
64
confidence in the capabilities and need for UHF television. The
Commission considered many potential solutions, but committed
65
itself to only a fraction of these.
66
At first, deintermixture was a fairly popular idea. Despite its early
resistance, the Commission seriously considered separating markets
few advertisers cared about UHF stations and their tiny audiences). Sterling and
Kittross compare many of the early difficulties of FM radio with those facing UHF
stations because both services struggled to find network affiliation and advertiser
interest in their early days, and both faced audiences who were content with their
pre-existing stations on other frequency bands. Id.
61. See id. at 356 (stating that both networks and advertisers used a method called
“circulation,” which counted “unique” viewers to determine where to award
affiliations and contracts).
62. OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23; see also NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at
103 (noting that UHF stations often had difficulty generating revenue because their
low budgets could only create low-quality programming, which resulted in a low
volume of viewers, which in turn resulted in low advertising revenue).
63. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23 (calling the UHF situation a
“chicken and egg” problem because the absence of network affiliation for UHF
stations at that time limited the advertising demand for them, and in turn, the
weakness of UHF stations hindered the development of a fourth network).
64. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶ 36 (noting that by
1955, over ninety percent of the population could receive service from at least one
television station, but that the Commission still faced major obstacles to its goals of
providing broad access to television across the country and competition in each
television market by using both the UHF and VHF bands). In 1955, the major
challenges facing struggling UHF stations were VHF-only receivers, VHF program
and revenue preferences, and UHF transmitter and receiver deficiencies. Id.
65. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 357-58 (explaining that the
Commission found that some proposals would not be effective to help UHF stations
or to solve the interference problem between VHF stations, and that others were
simply politically or technically infeasible); see also The Darkened Channels, supra note
8, at 1583-93 (outlining various Commission plans to remedy the ailments of
unsuccessful UHF stations, such as deintermixture and VHF drop-ins).
66. See The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1584 (naming Madison, Peoria,
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such that some would receive all-UHF television, and some all-VHF.
Eventually, and perhaps ironically, this idea gave way to a proposal
68
for an all-UHF television transition, which never became a reality.
The Commission also considered policies of selective deintermixture
and “VHF squeeze-ins,” whereby VHF allocations would be taken
from other uses and the entire band would be dedicated to
69
television.
Pay or subscription television was yet another idea
70
Under that plan, UHF would
floated through the Commission.
operate like cable or like the subscription-based movie channels
71
common today. None of these ideas ever seriously took hold, and
72
UHF television languished for some time. It was almost a decade
after the publication of the Sixth Report and Order of 1952 before
Congress took an initiative to help the drowning UHF stations.
In 1962, Congress passed the All-Channel Receiver Act, giving the
FCC the authority to require manufacturers to make television
73
receivers capable of receiving both UHF and VHF channels. This
Hartford, and Evansville as cities that petitioned the FCC in 1954 and 1955 for
deintermixture).
67. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 36-37 (providing a
short history of FCC solutions for struggling UHF television stations through 1977,
and concluding that neither deintermixture nor squeeze-ins would adequately serve
the Commission’s long-range objectives of making use of both UHF and VHF bands
to provide a wide variety of well-spaced signals in each community).
68. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶¶ 22, 26 (rejecting the all
UHF-television move based on the absence of any specific showings that justified
such extensive reallocation of television service); STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32,
at 357 (asserting that although converting to an all-UHF system would equalize the
competitive field among stations, it would be very expensive for VHF stations and
would reduce the number of signals that rural areas could receive).
69. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 36-37 (finding that
“squeeze-in” VHF stations would ultimately not serve the public’s best interests).
Prior to the surge in television popularity, the military controlled many spots on the
spectrum. In 1939, for example, twenty-six percent of the frequencies below 162
MHz were allocated exclusively to government agencies, including the military. See
SLOTTEN, supra note 32, at 146-48. Today, the FCC reserves some low-frequency
assignments for government uses, allocating some channels specifically for
emergency uses. Id.
70. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 326.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 359 (explaining that because Congress made most of the FCC’s
policy decisions, it was improbable that any Commission decision in the UHF area
would take hold until members of Congress and their constituents resolved their
conflicting viewpoints). See generally 1977 Television Assignments Order, supra note
23 (detailing the history of the Commission’s efforts assisting UHF television); 1978
UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37 (discussing various solutions to the
problems facing UHF television).
73. All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150. Under
this authority the Commission required that all TV receivers be capable of UHF
channel reception and adopted standards to make reception of UHF channels
comparable with reception of VHF channels. 47 C.F.R. § 15.117 (2003). See also
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Inquiry, Broadcast
Services, Advanced Television Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,130, 42,137 (Aug. 15, 1995)
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legislation was the first truly effective government effort towards UHF
channels. In the ten years after the All-Channel Act was passed, the
UHF market grew by 111 stations while the VHF market added only
74
forty-seven. The Commission continued to favor UHF between 1970
and 1973 by requiring receivers to better tune into both UHF and
75
Throughout the 1970s the Commission created several
VHF.
additional regulations mandating the improvement of television
receivers as an effort to bridge the technical gap between VHF and
76
UHF.
In 1978, the Commission created the UHF Comparability Task
Force, which was dedicated to the improvement of UHF television
77
service. By this time, television sets were receiving UHF, and the
78
stations on this band had been around for some time.
The
79
challenges still facing UHF at this point were primarily technical. A
1982 Report releasing the work of the UHF Task Force highlighted
this challenge and indicated that if the technical gap could be
[hereinafter 1995 Fourth NPRM, Advanced Television Systems].
74. Much of the burgeoning success of UHF after 1962 came directly from the
Commission’s efforts to encourage its growth. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra
note 45, ¶ 42. In fact, the FCC concluded that the statutory enactment of the AllChannel Receiver Law was an implicit directive to foster UHF television
development, even at the expense of VHF television. Id. This mentality gave rise to
the UHF Impact Policy, which would consider potential harm to UHF television over
potential success of a VHF station until its abolition in the 1980s. Id. See also
STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 381 (citing the lack of desirable VHF channels
as an additional factor in the rise in popularity of UHF channels between 1964-1974).
75. 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42, at 35,975.
76. For example, in 1978, the Commission acted to improve the quality of UHF
pictures by lowering the maximum “noise” figure allowed on each receiver, which
would reduce the amount of “snow” in each UHF picture displayed on a television
set. Id. The Commission also stated its commitment to opening new proceedings
designed to improve other aspects of UHF television performance, stating:
These initiatives will provide us with the opportunity to review from
television station studio to home video screen virtually all of the technical
factors which influence quality of UHF home television reception. We
believe that this is the best concentrated effort that we can undertake to help
UHF television at this time.
In the Matter of UHF Television Receiver Noise Figures, 69 F.C.C.2d 1866, ¶ 2
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 UHF Receiver Noise Figures]. These efforts paid off: In
1974, forty-eight percent of the UHF television stations reported financial data
indicating profitability that year. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 49.
The amount of households with UHF receivers increased by thirty-four percent in
just five years, to eighty-nine percent of households nationwide by 1974. Id.
77. See 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37, ¶ 1 (“Congress
approved a $750,000 appropriation and created five staff positions to examine
comparability for UHF and VHF television. Pub. L. No. 95-431, 92 Stat. 1040
(October 10, 1978).”)
78. See id. ¶ 7 (noting that the UHF television band was available for commercial
use in 1952).
79. See id. ¶ 18 (listing the potential areas of improvement that the task force
would evaluate, such as antenna height, quality of antennas and receivers, and
technical improvements to television sets).
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bridged, UHF had the potential to be quite profitable.
The
subsequent efforts of the FCC to bridge this gap through regulation
proved extremely effective, and UHF television quickly reached
81
viability.
C. Creating the UHF Discount
In 1984, the Commission increased the national broadcast
ownership limit on commercial television stations from seven to
82
twelve. Under the new rule, a company was permitted to own as
many as twelve television stations, provided that these stations did not
collectively reach more than twenty-five percent of the nation’s
83
viewing audience. From this time until the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, an entity could own television stations with an aggregate,
84
national reach of twenty-five percent of television-ready households.
The stated purpose of these rules was to weigh all of the
Commission’s goals and strike a balance between proper regulation
85
and healthy competition.
The Commission is dedicated to
promoting competition from smaller or independent media owners
86
and the “diversification of program and service viewpoints.” At the
same time, the Commission has an interest in allowing common
ownership of media outlets so that market power of companies can
87
grow and allow “efficiencies to be realized.”
80. See 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42, at 35,975 (observing
that perfect equality between UHF and VHF is not required in order to achieve a
“diverse and competitive UHF television service,” and advocating a “viable and
profitable UHF service on its own merits, without comparison to VHF”).
81. For a detailed discussion of the regulations created to foster the growth of
UHF television see infra Part III.B.
82. See In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections
73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, ¶¶ 4-10 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Multiple Ownership
Order] (concluding that the profound changes in American broadcasting over the
three decades since the Commission adopted the Seven Station Rule necessitated a
change in policy).
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Implementation of Sections 202(c)(1) and 202(e) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (National Broadcast Television Ownership and
Dual Network Operations), 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2003) (“Section 73.3555(e) of the
Commission’s Rules will be revised to reflect the changes directed by section
202(c)(1) of the Telecom Act . . . by increasing the national audience reach
limitation for television stations to 35%.”). National ownership was calculated then
as it is today. However, the Commission has made a subtle shift in its definition of
television markets, as it currently uses Designated Market Areas (“DMA”), which are
assigned by Nielson Media Research. § 73.3555(b).
85. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,752.
86. Id. at 65,768-69.
87. Id. The Commission justified the increase in the multiple ownership rule by
contending that the threat of scarcity in media was largely outdated. In the 1984
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When the Commission initially adopted this twelve station rule, it
88
treated UHF stations and VHF stations identically in its calculation.
Three parties subsequently petitioned the Commission for
reconsideration on this matter, asking that the rule give an extra
89
audience reach for UHF stations. The Commission considered the
issue, taking into account the evaluation of its UHF Comparability
Task Force, which found that the ultimate challenge facing UHF was
90
its physical inability to reach viewers. The Commision concluded
that there was “demonstrable progress in the viability of UHF
television,” but ultimately decided that the national multiple
ownership rules should reflect the ongoing physical limitations of the
91
UHF signal.
The Commission reasoned that it could best compensate for UHF
television’s technical weaknesses by expanding the authorized
92
audience reach limit for UHF stations. It found that this system
would provide a measure of the actual voice handicap of UHF
stations and, therefore, would be consistent with its traditional
93
objectives of localism, diversity, and competition. The rulemaking
amending the national ownership calculation ordered that UHF
stations should be attributed with only fifty percent of a recognized
94
television market, or Area of Dominant Influence (“ADI”). The rule
provides that the Commission will count a station on the UHF band
as fifty-percent of a station on the VHF band when calculating the
aggregate national ownership percentage belonging to a media

Report and Order increasing the station limit from seven to twelve, the Commission
cited improvements in technology, changes in spectrum regulation, and expanding
audience and advertising markets as evidence of this shift. See 1984 Multiple
Ownership Order, supra note 82, ¶ 7. In addition, the Commission stated that FM
radio stations and UHF television stations have emerged as thriving rivals of other
broadcasting outlets. Id.
88. 1984 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 82, ¶ 5.
89. 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶ 12 (“In
establishing an audience reach cap, Group W, Cox and MPAA each propose that the
Commission adopt rules which take cognizance of the difficulties faced by UHF
stations. Both Cox and Group W propose an additional reach limit of 2.5% for UHF
stations . . . .”).
90. See id. ¶¶ 42-44 (“Due to the physical nature of the UHF and VHF bands,
delivery of television signals is inherently more difficult at UHF. It should be
recognized that actual equality between these two services cannot be expected
because the laws of physics dictate that UHF signal strength will decrease more
rapidly with distance than does VHF signal strength.”).
91. Id.
92. See id. (refusing to simply increase the number of stations a company may
own with respect to UHF stations, reasoning that this does not adequately remedy
the physical limitations of the UHF signal).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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95

entity.
It assumes that the UHF signal only reaches half the
96
For
distance, and therefore, half the viewers of a VHF signal.
example, the theoretical ADI audience reach of the New York City
97
market comprises 7.72% of all television households. Under the
UHF discount provision, the owner of a UHF station in this market
would be attributed with an audience reach of only fifty percent of
98
this 7.72%, which equals 3.86% points towards national ownership.
Accordingly, a broadcast company can own two UHF stations for
every one VHF station under the national ownership cap limitation.
Thus, the “two-for-one” deal of the UHF discount was born.
III. IT IS TIME FOR THE FCC TO ELIMINATE THE UHF DISCOUNT
UHF stations have advanced considerably since the Sixth Report
and Order of 1952. Technological change, especially UHF signal
improvements and the advent of cable television, began to bridge the
99
gap between UHF and VHF television as far back the 1970s.
Currently, there are approximately four times more UHF stations on
100
Networks that primarily affiliate with
the air than VHF stations.
UHF stations are among the most successful in the media
101
marketplace. The UHF discount reflects a market that existed over
twenty years ago, and the Commission cannot justify maintaining a
102
rule that reflects a world that no longer exists.
The Commission
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President and CEO, Media Access
Project, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (May
29, 2003) (summarizing the Commission’s own findings of technical equality
between UHF and VHF television). When Media Access Project filed this letter in
opposition to the Biennial Broadcast Review Rules, it attached copied pages from the
Economic Analysis relied upon by the Commission in its decision to repeal the Prime
Time Access Rule. Id. This study states that “[t]here is no evidence that the UHF
handicap persists today” and asserts that the government interference with these
stations “makes society as a whole worse off.” ECONOMISTS INCORPORATED, PRIME TIME
ACCESS RULE: A SUPPLEMENTARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23, 58 (1995).
100. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (“Over-theair outlets include 1,331 commercial TV stations (752 UHF, 579 VHF) and 381 noncommercial, educational TV stations (254 UHF, 127 VHF).”).
101. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (ranking Viacom, which owns former
CBS and UPN (United Paramount) Groups, the top-ranked network in America,
with Fox coming in as the second-ranked network). The success of “baby networks”
such as the WB and UPN, which affiliate primarily with UHF stations, is the kind of
evidence that convinced the Commission to repeal other regulatory assistance
measures designed to foster the growth of UHF television. See 1995 PTAR Order,
supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-3, 70-80.
102. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56
(2003) (requiring the Commission to examine its rules biennially and retain only
those “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition”). Courts have held
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has repealed every other regulatory assistance to television stations on
this band, and has amassed innumerable findings along the way
103
Keeping the UHF
showing the robust health of UHF television.
discount in the face of this evidence is an unacceptable inconsistency
104
on the part of the FCC.
The most egregious effect of the UHF discount today is its
105
encouragement of ownership consolidation in broadcast television.
The largest media companies easily take advantage of the “two-forone” deal on UHF stations under the current rules, and thereby own
far more television stations than is allowed under the ownership cap.
Media concentration on this level poses a direct threat to
competition, diversity, and localism because it shuts smaller
106
competitors and independent owners out of the media market.
Thus when the Commission voted to raise the national ownership cap
to forty-five percent, it in fact elevated the cap much higher for
107
broadcast owners with the greatest buying power.
If keeping the
UHF discount posed a direct threat to the public interest before
June 2, 2003, perpetuating this provision while raising the national
ownership cap is a fatal blow to this principle.
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Commission’s Mandate to
Update Broadcast Regulations
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides
that the Commission shall review its ownership rules on a biennial
basis and “shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in
that this section carries with it a presumption toward change. See 2002 Biennial
Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287. Thus, unless the
Commission issues a report detailing its justification for maintaining a broadcast
rule, it must repeal or modify any existing rule. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148
(1999).
103. The Commission has issued various decisions over the past ten years
repealing regulatory assistance measures designed to foster the growth of UHF
stations. See, e.g., 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 4
(repealing the Secondary Affilation Rule); 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-4
(repealing the Prime Time Access Rule); 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note
14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (repealing the UHF Impact Policy and the Carroll Doctrine).
104. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,34041 (citing, in direct opposition to its previous findings, that UHF television has not
reached viability, that it continues to suffer from a technical handicap with respect to
VHF television, and that cable has not grown pervasive enough to justify eliminating
the rule).
105. Six of the largest broadcast companies, all of which have taken advantage of
the UHF discount, find themselves far above the ownership cap when the UHF
provision is eliminated. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (showing the top twentyfive TV-station groups and their national broadcast ownership with and without the
UHF discount).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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the public interest as the result of competition. The Commission
shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in
108
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
the public interest.”
which has jurisdiction over the FCC, has determined that this
provision of the 1996 Act carries with it a presumption in favor of
109
repealing or modifying ownership rules.
If the Commission
chooses instead to retain a rule under review, the Conference Report
accompanying the Act demands that the agency issue a report that
110
includes a full justification of the basis for so finding.
Thus, the
Commission should eliminate the UHF discount if it has evidence of
the viability of UHF television that could establish that this assistance
is no longer in the public interest. This section argues that the
Commission has exactly such evidence, and accordingly, should have
repealed this rule in its most recent review.
The first major aid to UHF television since its inception fifty years
ago came from the evolution of viewer behavior. Although viewers
once shied away from the stations on UHF, evidence of the growth of
111
stations on this signal proves that audience prejudice has changed.
112
In 1975, for example, there were only 344 UHF stations.
Today,
113
There are approximately three
that number has grown to 931.
times more UHF stations today than in the 1970s. VHF stations, by
114
contrast, have only grown from 609 to 688.
The primary developments that have equalized UHF and VHF
television, however, are technological. Over the past thirty years,
improvements in the design of television receivers substantially
improved the quality of reception of UHF stations in over-the-air
115
These changes came largely through
(non-cable) television.
Commission regulations designed to bridge the technical gap
116
between the two signals.
108. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56
(2003).
109. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (concluding that the Commission may only retain a rule if it is necessary in the
public interest).
110. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148 (1999).
111. For more figures showing the growth of UHF stations see supra Part III.A and
infra Part III.B.
112. 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 18-26.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 123 (noting that thirty years ago the UHF
handicap was waning, due partly to the rise in popularity of cable, and in part
because FCC regulations mandated improvements to UHF receivers).
116. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Commission’s regulations and policies
throughout the 1970s and 1980s that were designed to improve the technical
qualities of the UHF signal).

ROTHENBERGER.AUTHORCHANGES2.FINAL.DOC

2004]

SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST

4/30/2004 2:39 PM

709

Cable television finally closed the gap between UHF and VHF
television. Most Americans today likely could not distinguish
between stations on these two bands because of cable. Approximately
eighty-five percent of households nationwide receive their television
117
through some kind of cable or satellite service.
Further, cable now
“passes” through over ninety-seven percent of all homes, which
means that almost every household in America is able to receive cable
118
119
if desired.
This figure is up from seventy-five percent in 1985.
Over cable, VHF and UHF channels are equal, both in the distance of
120
each signal’s reach and in picture quality. Additionally, in order to
ensure equal treatment of UHF and VHF over cable, Congress passed
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, which requires cable operators to carry a certain number of
121
local over-the-air broadcast signals.
In short, cable is the great
117. Currently over 106 million television households in United States are served
by a variety of video outlets. See Comments of the United Church of Christ, Black
Citizens for a Fair Media, Civil Rights Forum, Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task
Force, and Women’s Institute for Freedom of the Press, In the Matter of 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rule and
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local
Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, MB Docket No. 02-277, MM Docket Nos. 01235, 01-317, 00-244, at 57 (Jan. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review) [hereinafter UCC et al. Comments] (placing the number of households
subscribing to standard cable at 69 million nationwide); 2002 Biennial Broadcast
Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (citing Nielson Media Research).
118. Statement of Commission Kevin Martin, In the Matter of Annual Assessment
of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming,
17 F.C.C.R. 1244, ¶ 17 (2001).
119. Only thirty-seven million households subscribed to cable in 1985, while sixtynine million subscribe today. See UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 57 (citing
JONATHAN LEVY ET AL., BROADCAST TELEVISION: SURVIVOR IN A SEA OF COMPETITION 41
(2002)).
120. See In the Matter of Broadcast Television National Ownership Rules—Review
of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11
F.C.C.R. 19,949, ¶¶ 11-16 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM]
(describing the narrowing gap between the two frequency bands); 1995 Review of
Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 20 (noting that the role of cable carriage has
decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations).
121. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (“Each cable operator shall carry, on the
cable system of that operator, the signals of local commercial television stations and
qualified low power stations as provided by this section . . . .”); FCC Broadcast Radio
Services, 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2001) (mandating the carriage of noncommercial
television stations). At one time, the precarious constitutional standing of these
must-carry rules served as an argument for retaining the UHF discount. See 1996
Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 9-16. ALTV and Silver King,
commenting in favor of retaining the UHF discount, contended that the thenuncertain state of the must-carry rules required that the UHF discount remain in
effect because without a must-carry requirement, UHF stations would be at a greater
disadvantage due to the additional and expensive technical requirements they must
overcome. Id. However, the Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of
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equalizer of television signals, and the vast majority of Americans
have cable. Thus, the Commission is perpetuating the UHF discount
for approximately three percent of the country—hardly a regulation
in the name of the public interest.
Notably, as early as 1989, the Commission sought comments on
whether the UHF discount itself was becoming unnecessary because
122
of the pervasiveness of cable. At that time, just over sixty percent of
households subscribed to cable, a level of access sufficient for the
Commission to begin seriously considering eliminating this rule at
123
that time.
Ironically, the majority stated throughout the 2002 Broadcast
Review that changes in technology and within the marketplace call
124
for changes in broadcast rules.
Nevertheless, the empirical
evidence demonstrating the advancement of UHF television, in
addition to the Commission’s own findings of technological
improvements and UHF viability, were ineffective to convince the
125
Commission to eliminate the UHF discount.
these rules in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997), noting:
Must-carry was designed to serve three interrelated interests:
(1) preservingthe benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television,
(2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for
television programming market.
Id. at 189 (internal quotations omitted).
122. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (repealing
the UHF Impact Policy).
123. See id. (confirming that the ever-decreasing difference between UHF and
VHF was enough to repeal the provision); see also Bill McConnell, Capitol’s Goodmon
Urges End to UHF Discount, BROAD. & CABLE, May 30, 2003, at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA302578 (on file with the American
University Law Review) (reporting that the head of Capitol Broadcasting Company
asserted that the discount is no longer necessary and is in fact harmful to the public
interest, citing the negligible difference between a station signal on each band as
support for his position).
124. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and
Definition of Radio Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, ¶ 3 (2003).
Americans today have more media choices, more sources of news and
information, and more varied entertainment programming available to them
than ever before. A generation ago, only science fiction writers dreamed of
satellite-delivered television, cable was little more than a means of delivering
broadcast signals to remote locations, and the seeds of the Internet were just
being planted in a Department of Defense project. Today, hundreds of
channels of video programming are available in every market in the country
and, via the Internet, Americans can access virtually any information,
anywhere, on any topic.
Id.; see also FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration, 2003 WL 21251881 (June 2, 2003)
(noting the FCC’s findings that Americans rely on a variety of media outlets, not just
broadcast television, for news and information).
125. See Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, Dissenting, Regarding
the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
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The Commission has evidence of changes to UHF television that
render the UHF discount unnecessary.
According to the
presumption in favor of change that Section 202 carries, the
Commission should have eliminated this rule. Giving evidence
different weight in different situations, as it appears the Commission
does with facts showing technological advancements and a changed
marketplace, creates analytical inconsistency. Greater still is the
inconsistency between the Commission’s hands-off approach to the
UHF discount and the line of decisions eliminating other regulations
that assisted once-ailing UHF stations.
B. Maintaining the UHF Discount is Inconsistent with a Line of Decisions
Eliminating Regulatory Assistance Measures for UHF Television
The Commission’s findings throughout the 1980s and 1990s
indicated that the gap between UHF and VHF television was drawing
126
to a close.
Throughout those decades, the Commission began
repealing regulations designed to aid UHF stations based on
evidence showing their technical improvement and economic
127
viability. These Orders show the years of findings that spurred the
recission of many rules, providing logical support for the elimination
of the UHF discount. Inexplicably, the Commission has failed to
consider this evidence as grounds to do so.
A close look at the history of FCC rulemakings shows that the
Commission began to change its attitude toward protecting UHF
Ownership Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (Jun. 2, 2003), at http:// hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-235047A8.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (“If the
purpose of this exercise is to update our rules in light of technological developments,
we can’t ignore some just because we don’t like the outcome of more stringent
limits.”); Owen Gibson, U.S. Plans Radical Revamp of Media Ownership Rules, GUARDIAN,
May 13, 2003 (citing Gene Kimmelman of the Consumer’s Union: “If the theory
behind changing the rules is that the FCC needs to keep up with market conditions,
to preserve a significant discount for UHF stations is simply a fraud on the regulatory
process . . . .”), available at http://media.guardian.com/Uk/Print/0,3858,4667699105240,00.html. Another controversial argument regarding the Commission’s
inconsistency in its most recent Broadcast Order is that the Commission chose to
maintain the UHF discount provision for the television duopoly rule, but discarded it
in media cross-ownership regulations and for the local ownership rule. See Adelstein,
supra (calling this phenomenon the Commission’s “most inexplicable
inconsistency”). But see 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note
4, at 46,299 (arguing that these rules regulate different media entities and different
ownership situations, and should thus be construed differently).
126. See 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16 (describing the
narrowing gap in signal quality between UHF and VHF signals and how it requires a
review of existing law).
127. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,34849 (describing how the FCC’s biennial reviews take into account the changing
technology in the decision to change existing rules).
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128

stations as early as 1977. In 1960, the Commission sought to protect
UHF stations with the UHF Impact Policy, which restricted the
competition presented by new VHF television stations to UHF
129
stations. Under the UHF Impact Policy, a UHF station owner could
prevent the Commission from granting a license to a new VHF station
by proving that building this station would cause the UHF station
130
economic harm.
Subsequent technical advancements to television
sets and UHF receivers fostered the growth of UHF television, and by
the mid 1970s, the Commission substantially relaxed this competitive
131
restriction.
In 1988 the Commission eliminated the UHF Impact Policy,
finding that the UHF service had achieved a sufficient degree of
comparability with the VHF service to obviate the need for this
132
restriction.
Findings showed that UHF television had improved
“dramatically,” and that the signal disparities between UHF and VHF
133
service had been largely eliminated.
Numerous findings like this
kindled a wave of rulemakings in the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s eliminating provisions that were designed to compensate for
134
the technical and market handicaps of UHF television.
The
Commission found that restricting competition from VHF stations
135
against UHF stations was no longer necessary in the public interest.
In 1995, the Commission repealed the Secondary Affiliations rule,
which was created in 1971 to encourage greater access to network
136
programming for then-struggling UHF stations.
When the
128. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 2-5, 47-48
(reexamining UHF Impact Policy restrictions in light of the health of UHF
television).
129. See id.
130. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, ¶ 1.
131. See 1977 Television Assignments Order, supra note 23, ¶ 48 (changing the
UHF Impact Policy to favor VHF stations by holding that “regardless of the
characterization of the impact on UHF, a VHF applicant may now demonstrate by
countervailing evidence, that, overall, the weight of the public interest favors the
grant of an application . . . .” ).
132. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31, 47
(concluding that continuing this policy would likely produce negative effects on the
public interest by hindering the introduction of new VHF service).
133. See id. ¶ 27 (concluding that the “dramatic improvement” to UHF television
resulted from the continuing growth of the television market and Commission
requirements for changes in television receiver designs that significantly eradicated
the technical handicap of the UHF signal service).
134. See 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-3, 76-80 (repealing the Prime Time
Access Rule); 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 4-26
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule and the Network Station Ownership Rule).
135. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 4-26.
136. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26
(ordering the elimination of both the Secondary Affiliation Rule and the Network
Station Ownership Rule). The Network Station Ownership rule was not specifically
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Secondary Affiliation Rule was adopted, there were certain markets
with two VHF network affiliates and one UHF independent station.
In such markets, the third network would choose to place its
programs on one or both of the VHF stations on a secondary basis
137
rather than to affiliate with the UHF station.
The provision
restricted a station from acquiring a second network affiliation by
directing that a network first offer affiliation to an independent,
138
unaffilliated station.
The basic goal underlying the Commission’s
adoption of the Secondary Affiliation Rule was to increase the
likelihood that UHF television would develop into a viable and
139
competitive service.
By the mid 1990s, however, the Commission could not ignore the
improvement of UHF television, and repealed the Secondary
Affiliation Rule based on two major factors: (1) the improvement of
UHF reception; and (2) the increased availability of programming
140
and competition for affiliates.
The Commission concluded that
these developments removed the factors for which the Secondary
141
It found that
Affiliation Rule was designed to compensate.
independent UHF stations had become more competitive despite
their lack of affiliation with the traditional networks and concluded
that they no longer appear to need regulatory assistance to attract
142
affiliations of new networks.
created to assist UHF stations, and thus is not treated in the text of this Comment.
See id. ¶¶ 1-11. This rule was created to preserve localism of television in rural areas.
Id. The Commission decided to eliminate this rule based on technological
advancements since its inception in 1946 and the growth of media outlets in rural
areas, reasoning that both have rendered this limitation on networks unnecessary
and overly restrictive. Id.
137. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
138. Id. ¶ 12. The Secondary Affiliate Rule required that in TV markets where two
of the three traditional networks already have an affiliate, a network with no affiliate
in the market must offer prime-time programs and weekend sports events to
independent stations with facilities comparable to the other network affiliates (UHF
or VHF) before offering the programs to either of the two affiliated stations. Id.
139. See id. ¶¶ 12-26 (recounting the difficulty that UHF stations had attracting
network affiliation in 1971).
140. Id. ¶¶ 18-26. The Order asserted that advances in television design and the
role of cable carriage had decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations, and
that these developments had “substantially alleviated” the technical disadvantages
facing UHF receivers. Id. ¶ 20.
141. Id.; see also supra Part III.A (describing the Commission’s findings of the
growth and viability of UHF stations).
142. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 22 (finding that of
Fox’s 140 primary affiliates, 121 (86%) are UHF stations; of United Paramount’s 95
affiliates, 78 (82%) are UHF stations; and of Warner Brothers 43 affiliates, 34 (79%)
are UHF stations). Notably, the successful affiliation of UHF stations was not a result
of the Secondary Affiliation Rule, because none of the newer networks, such as Fox,
United Paramount, and Warner Brothers, were subject to the rule. Rather, these
networks chose to affiliate with UHF stations of their own accord. Id.
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The 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order is a powerful piece of
evidence showing the Commission’s acknowledgement of UHF
viability and foreshadows a general movement away from regulations
assisting UHF television. Specifically, the Commission found a 250%
growth in the number UHF stations over the previous two decades as
143
well as a tripling of profits over the previous year. The Order noted
the recent elimination of the Secondary Affiliation rule, and
previewed its request for comments on the comparability between
144
UHF and VHF television. While this Order did not do away with all
regulatory assistance measures for UHF television, the fact that the
Commission was seeking comment on the topic is proof of the
Commission’s inference, almost ten years ago, that UHF television
could be healthy enough to stand on its own.
The next UHF assistance measure that met its end in 1995 was the
145
Prime Time Access Rule (“PTAR”).
PTAR prohibited networkaffiliated television stations in the top fifty television markets from
broadcasting more than three hours of network programs during the
146
four prime time viewing hours.
This rule was created in 1970 in
response to a concern that the three major television networks—
ABC, CBS, and NBC—dominated the program production market
147
and inhibited the development of competing program sources.
The rule was seen as a way to promote the growth of independent
stations by preventing them from competing with Top 50 Market
148
Affiliates in acquiring off-network programs.
The Commission
found that the rule did not address the technical disparity between
UHF and VHF, but rather provided a competitive advantage to
independent stations by limiting the programming options available
to Top 50 Market Affiliates, even in cases where the affected network
149
affiliates were themselves UHF stations.
Ultimately, the FCC
143. Id. ¶ 23. The Commission found that in 1971, there were 179 commercial
UHF television stations on the air and as of December 31, 1994, the number of
commercial UHF stations had risen to 601, an increase of 235 percent. Id. It further
stated that profits for UHF independents, on average, have risen dramatically since
that year. Id. In 1992, average profits were $552,000, and in 1993, average profits
tripled to $ 1.5 million. Id.
144. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 23. Here, the
Commission recognized that the UHF service had achieved enough comparability
with VHF to eliminate the Secondary Affiliation Rule and noted the elimination of
the UHF Impact Policy in 1987. It asserted that this degree of comparability may not
be enough to warrant the rescission of all rules designed to promote UHF stations,
but asked for comment on the issue of VHF/UHF comparability. Id.
145. See 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77-80.
146. Id. ¶ 1.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 79.
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concluded that the UHF handicap did not justify continuing the
150
Prime Time Access Rule.
In the Review of the Prime Time Access Rule Order, the
Commission recognized the robust growth of UHF television, as well
as the vast improvements to quality of the UHF signal, and found that
the pervasiveness of cable removes all disparities between UHF and
151
VHF television in almost every home in the nation.
The
Commission also found that the development of the new networks,
such as United Paramount Network (“UPN”) and Warner Brothers’
WB network were indications of the health of UHF television, as these
networks affiliate primarily with UHF stations.
152
In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act. This law
made sweeping changes to broadcast ownership rules, and mandated
153
that the Commission review its broadcast rules biennially. The Act
154
However,
was explicitly silent with respect to the UHF discount.
growing evidence of unprecedented media concentration, and the
role that the UHF discount played in this concentration, became a
155
concern for the Commission.
As a result, in its first Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
Commission sought comments on retaining the discount based on its
findings that technological advancements and the high penetration
156
rate of cable may have rendered the provision unnecessary.
150. Id.
151. Id. ¶¶ 76-80; see also Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman to Marlene H.
Dortch, supra note 99 (summarizing many arguments in favor of repealing the UHF
discount, such as the inconsistency of its use in Commission rules, as well as the
advances in technology and viewer behavior that have rendered it unnecessary).
152. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
153. Before the 1996 Act, media entities were not allowed to own more than
twelve television stations, or own stations that would, in the aggregate, result in
national aggregate ownership of more than twenty-five percent. 1996 Broadcast
Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16.
154. Telecommunications Act of 1996; 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra
note 120, ¶¶ 1-16.
155. See Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(discussing the Commission’s recognition of growing consolidation, as well as the
findings that put them on notice). The Court further noted that since the passage of
the 1996 Telecommunication Act there has been a “resultant downward trend in the
number of station owners in each market.” Id. This consolidation prompted the
Commission to “engage in an exercise in line drawing” between allowing
broadcasters to realize economic efficiencies on one hand, and ensuring diversity
and competition on the other hand. Id.
156. 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16. This Notice also
sought comments on whether the Commission should impose supplementary
limitations on the national ownership reach until the UHF discount issue was
resolved. Id. Thus, the Commission acknowledged in this Notice that the UHF
discount encouraged media concentration by effectively raising the national
ownership cap. The Commission cautioned that an owner who was allowed to own
thirty-five percent of the national audience could exercise too much control over the
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In 1998, the Commission reconsidered the status of the UHF
discount but concluded that the technical disparity between the
signals had not been completely ameliorated and did not justify
repealing the UHF discount, despite growing evidence from
commentators that the handicaps facing UHF television had largely
157
Companies like ABC, CME Press Broadcasting, and
disappeared.
Greater Media argued that the pervasiveness of cable, along with vast
technical improvements in the industry had almost completely
158
eliminated the reasons for the creation of the UHF discount.
The Commission is currently taking comments regarding the
elimination of the discount based on whether or not the language of
the 2004 Appropriations Act signifies “congressional approval,
159
adoption or ratification” of the UHF discount.
Beyond this
consideration of congressional intent, the Commission’s posture on
the UHF discount in the 2002 Biennial Review suggested that it will
consider applying a sunset provision to the UHF discount once the
transition to digital television is nearly complete, although it declined
160
The Commission reasoned that
to fix a date for that transition.
digital television will “substantially equalize” UHF and VHF signals,
but failed to explain how this “substantial equality” is more significant
or persuasive than the “substantial alleviation” of the technical
media by virtue of the UHF discount. Id.
157. See In the Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
11,058, ¶¶ 35-38 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Biennial Broadcast Review Order]
(concluding that the UHF discount remains necessary in the public interest because
the handicap experienced by UHF stations has not yet been fully eliminated).
158. Id. In addition, these companies proposed plans such as calculating the
disparity on a market-by-market basis, or implementing a discount that properly
reflects the large number o-f households who subscribe to cable, and thus, do not
experience disparities between signals. Id.
159. 2004 UHF Discount Comment Request, supra note 6, at 9215.
160. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Rules Order, supra note 4, at 43,337
(reasoning that roughly thirty percent of televisions in the United States receive only
free over-the-air television, and that UHF stations still cover smaller areas than VHF
stations). The Commission found that this technical inequality continues to effect
UHF television’s ability to compete with VHF television. Id. The Commission
further found that the UHF discount has promoted the entry of new broadcast
networks into the market, which have improved consumer choice and program
diversity for those with and without cable and satellite television service. Id. Notably,
the Commission has not confirmed that it will eliminate this provision after the
transition to digital cable. Id. Rather, it plans to sunset the application of the UHF
discount for the stations owned by the top four broadcast networks (i.e., CBS, NBC,
ABC and Fox) as the transition to digital television draws to a close, on a market-bymarket basis. Id. It further noted that “this sunset will apply unless, prior to that
time, the Commission makes an affirmative determination that the public interest
would be served by continuation of the discount beyond the digital transition.” Id. at
46,341.
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161

inequalities the Commission found in 1995.
Likewise, the
Commission failed to explain why the equality brought to UHF and
VHF by digital television is more persuasive than its 2002 finding that
162
UHF and VHF signals were “largely equalized” over cable.
This
about-face is more inexplicable given that the Commission took
comments on eliminating the UHF discount in the 2002 Biennial
163
Review.
The Commission has gathered abundant evidence on the
performance of UHF television, the growth of cable, and the effects
of its own regulations to foster the growth of UHF stations. Despite
the strength of its findings on the health of UHF television, the
Commission has failed to apply this evidence to the UHF discount.
The improvements to UHF television that justified repealing three
164
prior auxiliary regulations had not disappeared.
Nevertheless, the
Commission has refused to apply this evidence to the question of
retaining the UHF discount. Although the Commission designed
each UHF-assistance rule to compensate for a different aspect of the
165
UHF handicap,
it should define viability consistently when
describing UHF television in the marketplace. From one order to the
next, the Commission inconsistently evaluates UHF television stations
161. In its 1995 Order eliminating the Secondary Affiliation rule, the Commission
asserted that advances in television design and the role of cable carriage had
decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations, and that these developments
“substantially alleviated” the technical disadvantages facing UHF receivers. 1995
Review of Broadcast Rules, supra note 12, ¶ 20.
162. In the 2002 Biennial Review, the Commission refused to apply this evidence
of signal equality or the advent of cable to the arguments for repealing the UHF
discount. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341.
163. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,768. In the
Biennial Review the Commission questioned the extent of the UHF handicap today,
noting that over eighty-six percent of consumers receive video programming, which
equalizes UHF and VHF signals, and that the must-carry rules ensure that cable
subscribers receive local UHF stations. Id.
164. See 1998 Biennial Broadcast Review Order, supra note 157, ¶¶ 35-38
(conceding that evidence of improvements to UHF television proved sufficient to
repeal other regulatory assistance measures to these stations). The order cites the
repeal of the Prime Time Access Rule and the repeal of the Policy under which
applications to initiate VHF service were considered contrary to the public interest if
they threatened adverse economic impact on existing or potential UHF stations. Id.
¶ 35. This Order fails to mention the repeal of the Secondary Affiliation rule
discussed above, but it also falls in the same line of reasoning. See 1995 Review of
Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26 (repealing the Secondary
Affiliation rule based on significant improvements to UHF television).
165. The Secondary Affiliation Rule was designed to help UHF stations attract
network affiliates. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 1226. The UHF Impact Policy was designed to give UHF stations preference over VHF
stations in license applications and renewals. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order,
supra note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31. The UHF discount was initially designed to compensate
for the technical handicap of the UHF signal. See 1985 Amended Multiple
Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶ 5.
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and the networks affiliated with them. The Commission also
inconsistently evaluates the viability of UHF television with respect to
each rule. For example, in the orders repealing the Secondary
Affiliation Rule, UHF Impact Policy, and Prime Time Access Rule,
the Commission asserts the viability of UHF television as justification
166
for its decision. By contrast, the 2002 Biennial Review Order insists
that disparities in economic and technical viability continue to exist
between UHF and VHF stations sufficient to support the
167
continuation of the UHF discount.
C. The UHF Discount Harms the Public Interest by Encouraging
Media Concentration
Ownership consolidation in the media marketplace decimates
competition, localism, and diversity by centralizing the control of
media outlets in the hands of very few. The UHF discount
encourages media concentration by effectively increasing the
national ownership cap for broadcast companies that choose to
168
purchase UHF stations.
By allowing a “two-for-one” deal on UHF
stations as compared to VHF stations, this provision allows broadcast
companies with the greatest buying power to own far more stations
169
than the national ownership cap permits.
In the interest of
preserving competition, localism, and diversity, the Commission
should have eliminated the UHF discount while the ownership cap
was at thirty-five percent. After the 2002 broadcast review and
subsequent amendments to the elevated ownership cap levels, it is
more critical than ever to eliminate this provision in order to serve
170
the public interest.
A close look at the holdings of the most powerful broadcast
companies shows how severely the UHF discount distorts ownership

166. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 18-26
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation rule); 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra
note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (eliminating the UHF Impact Policy); 1995 PTAR Order, supra
note 14, ¶¶ 1-4, 18-25 (repealing the Prime Time Access Rule).
167. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,34041.
168. By counting each UHF station as one half of a VHF station, the discount
allows media companies to own twice as many UHF stations as VHF stations, and, in
total, many more stations than they could own if the rules counted both UHF and
VHF stations as whole stations. Zuckerman, supra note 3; Miller & Trigoboff, supra
note 9.
169. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9.
170. Note that the current national ownership cap is set at thirty-nine percent
according to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, §
629, 118 Stat. 3.
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171

calculations under Commission rules. When the ownership cap sat
at thirty-five percent, some broadcast companies, like Fox and
172
Viacom, violated these rules even with the UHF discount intact.
For example, Viacom has 39% coverage nationwide and Fox sits at
173
37.8% when UHF stations are counted as one-half of VHF stations.
If the Commission had eliminated the UHF discount while
maintaining the cap at thirty-five percent, many more companies
would have found themselves in violation. Paxson, without the UHF
discount, has 68% national coverage; Viacom owns 44.8%, Univision
174
41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%.
Thus, well before the
Commission acted to allow greater national ownership, broadcast
companies with serious buying power were taking advantage of the
UHF discount to stay within the rules. This level of concentration,
encouraged by the UHF discount, runs counter to the public interest.
The Federal Communications Commission defines the public
interest as that which maximizes competition, localism, and diversity
175
in broadcast media. These tenets have provided the bedrock of the
176
Commission’s broadcast rules since the advent of television.
Localism, for instance, has operated as a goal for broadcast television
177
since its development in the 1940s and 1950s.
In fact, the FCC
issued most of its early broadcast regulations to maintain localism in
178
mass media. The original Radio Act of 1927 focused on providing
171. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (ranking the top twenty-five TV-station
groups by using the FCC method of calculating national ownership reach).
172. See id. (explaining that these stations sit above the current cap because they
were allowed to “grandfather” in these ownership relationships pending review of the
ownership rules).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. For a more detailed discussion of the FCC and the public interest see supra
Part II.A.
176. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,756
(identifying the Commission’s three important public interest goals as “diversity,
competition, and localism,” and asserting that the commission long embraced these
values as the foundation of its ownership regulations and policies).
177. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 97-100 (asserting that a “local service
doctrine” shaped the Commission’s early vision for broadcast, in which the
Commission hoped that “[s]tations would be owned and operated by local residents,
and would devote considerable broadcast time to information and commentary on
important local issues”). According to the Commission’s vision, “stations would be
instruments for community enlightenment and cohesion, much like the hometown
newspaper of an earlier era.” Id. at 100.
178. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760
(explaining that “[f]rom the earliest days of broadcasting, federal regulators sought
to foster the provision of programming that meets local communities’ needs and
interests”); see also NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 97-128 (citing the role of the
localism doctrine in regulations governing group ownership and cross-media
ownership and suggesting that the Commission’s “localism doctrine” drove the
promotion of UHF as a way to increase both competition and localism). The
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communications equally throughout the five original broadcast
179
zones. Another major statutory basis for the primacy of localism in
180
broadcasting is Section 307 of the Communications Act of 1934,
which has evolved into the Commission’s “local service” doctrine,
marked by the Commission’s work to establish radio and television
181
stations in as many communities as possible.
UHF television was a locally-minded answer to the television freeze
of the 1950s because it created television stations for more
182
communities.
The FCC envisioned the television station owner as
“a kind of latter-day Mark Twain who understands the needs and
183
concerns of his community in an imaginative and sensitive way.”
Creating UHF television was the ideal way to reduce interference
between existing stations and to unsaturate the VHF band while
184
encouraging more communities to own local outlets.
The FCC’s efforts to develop UHF stations into healthy competitors
185
fell in step with this notion of localism. Indeed, creating the UHF
discount was another way to encourage localism by fostering the
186
growth of these once-local stations. However, the ultimate effect of
Commission chose to increase the number of television stations by using the UHF
band in addition to VHF, and chose to limit the power at which these new stations
could operate in order to keep them as local as possible. Id. at 101-04.
179. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 98-99 (noting a 1928 amendment to the Act
that “required ‘equality’ of radio reception and transmission in each of the five
broadcast zones set up in the original act”).
180. This provision of the Communications Act dates back to the Radio Act of
1927, with modifications over time. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra
note 24, at 65,760.
181. NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 98-99. Today, this provision states:
In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals
thereof, when and insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission
shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and
of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair,
efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same.
47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2003).
182. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 101-04 (explaining that the key issue during
the television freeze was the choice between local and regional television stations,
forced by the limited amount of VHF spectrum that was dedicated to television, and
stating that the Commission made its preference for localism clear when it chose to
authorize more local stations at lower powers rather than to allow the creation of a
fourth network that would provide options regionally).
183. See id. at 104.
184. See id. at 101-03.
185. See generally 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42 (dedicating
a task force to study UHF television and make recommendations to the Commission
as to how to improve this service so that more communities may have their own
television outlets).
186. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760-61.
[T]he Commission has licensed stations to serve local communities,
pursuant to section 307(b) of the 1934 Act, and it has obligated them to
serve the needs and interests of their communities. Stations may fulfill this
obligation by presenting local news and public affairs programming and by
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this rule has created too much concentration among the largest
187
When a network owns the majority of
broadcast companies.
commercial television stations in the country, it creates an absentee
owner situation that runs contrary to the FCC’s vision for television.
In short, the Commission’s “latter-day Mark Twain” is now sitting on
the eighty-first floor in midtown Manhattan.
Another major concern in this arena is the overwhelming power
that the networks have over local affiliates. Rules that encourage
greater network ownership of stations threaten to leave communities
without local programming or a diversity of voices because large
networks wield more power in their negotiations over station
188
programming.
Networks naturally prefer to run content that will
189
attract the most viewers at the lowest cost to them.
Such
190
programming is network programming, not local programming.
The advertising revenue a program earns depends on the size of its
191
audience or the number of viewers that the advertiser can reach. It
is far less costly to show Friends or Seinfeld than community shows or
192
Local shows are expensive to create
locally produced-programs.
selecting programming based on the particular needs and interests of the
station’s community.
Id. (internal citations omitted). UHF stations were limited to operating at lower
power levels in order to maintain their localism. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at
103; OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23. Thus, fostering the growth of these local
outlets is a way to further a doctrine of localism.
187. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (calculating national ownership for the
top media companies without the UHF discount). Without the UHF discount
provision, Paxson would reach 61.8% of U.S. homes, Viacom 44.8%, Fox 44.4%,
Univision 41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%. Id. at 2-3. The UHF discount
therefore allows six of the top media markets to operate above the thirty-five percent
national ownership limits. Id.
188. See Matthew Rose & Joe Flint, Behind Media-Ownership Fight, An Old Power
Struggle is Raging, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A1 (reporting on the struggle by
affiliate station owners against networks who try to force network-preferred television
lineups on affiliates); 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶ 7 (noting
a petitioner’s warning “that retaining the UHF discount [allows] developing
networks, which affiliate primarily with UHF stations, to ‘subvert’ [the national
ownership restrictions] and actually to reach double the audience of operators with
mostly VHF stations” and thereby allows networks to gain enough market power to
pressure a small-station affiliate to show network programming over local
programming, regardless of that station’s preference); see also UCC et al. Comments,
supra note 117, at 52 (“[D]iversifying station ownership at the national level helps to
ensure that local needs and program preferences are met.”).
189. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 60-61 (discussing the economics of network
programming).
190. See id. (“Networks thus acquire, and offer to affiliates, programming more
appealing than that available from nonnetwork sources . . . .”).
191. See id. at 60.
192. See id. (“[T]he greater the popularity of network programs the smaller the
share of revenue required to make them more popular to a station.”); Joe Flint,
Dearth of Network Sitcoms Hurts Stations Seeking Reruns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2004, at B1
(noting that large syndication revenues for popular network programs make these
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and only bring in a fraction of the advertising revenue that network
193
programming attracts. Local station owners often run into trouble
in today’s broadcast market when they choose to run local
programming to serve the community. Networks can threaten to cut
194
payments to local stations and thereby usurp station decisions.
Alarmingly, local stations are often forced to air programming that is
offensive to community standards instead of local or “family-friendly”
195
programming. In fact, stations are suffering from these strong-arm
196
tactics ever more frequently.
Media concentration also stifles ownership and viewpoint diversity.
Diversity has its roots in the public interest concerns of the Radio Act
197
of 1927, but was explicitly designated as the primary safeguard of
the public interest in broadcast by both the Federal Radio
198
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.
Diversity also plays a critical role in the advancement of First
Amendment values by ensuring a broad variety of speech over the
199
airwaves.
The Commission’s goal of diversity of ownership derives from a
theory that a variety of owners in broadcast will produce the greatest
array of viewpoints, as well as prevent an undue concentration of
programs more profitable and relatively less expensive to produce).
193. See Flint, supra note 192; UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 52-58
(arguing that allowing the networks to own more local stations will make these
stations more likely to broadcast content based on the financial interests of the
networks, not the preferences of local viewers).
194. Networks frequently force local stations to air the shows that networks prefer,
regardless of the station’s efforts to serve the needs and tastes of their local
communities. See Rose & Flint, supra note 188.
195. See id. (explaining how networks gain the upper hand against broadcast
stations through “preemption deals” by forcing them to show the program that
networks want aired).
196. Capital Broadcasting Company is one example of stations fighting back
against network pressure. See Rose & Flint, supra note 188 (discussing Capitol
Broadcasting Company CEO John Goodman’s fight to select programming that he
feels is in the best interest of his own community over network protests).
197. See Radio Act of 1927 § 4, 69 Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927)
(establishing the Federal Radio Commission to allocate frequencies among
applicants in a manner responsive to the “public interest, convenience, or
necessity”).
198. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (citing the
Commission’s view in 1929 that the “public interest requires ample play for the free
and fair competition of opposing views . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); 2002
Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,756 (contending “[t]he
diversity of viewpoints, by promoting an informed citizenry, is essential to a wellfunctioning democracy”).
199. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 18,516 (citing
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) for the proposition that the
First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public”).
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200

economic power. The Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, found that the First Amendment’s purpose is “to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
201
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”
Different owners are likely to have different political and economic
interests, and the public benefits from this variety by being better
202
informed.
Those fighting media concentration contend that the
media’s failure to cover recent corporate scandals, such as those at
Enron and WorldCom, had much to do with concentration of
ownership in media corporations because so many of the large media
companies were concerned with making business deals to merge or
203
aquire these very companies.
The concentration encouraged by
rules like the UHF discount stifles independent voices and
204
205
compromises community values and community needs.
200. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,28789 (outlining the five types of diversity that comprise a major policy objective in
broadcast, including viewpoint, outlet, program, source, and minority and female
ownership diversity).
201. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
202. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press found
widespread concern among journalists that certain news stories were being
manipulated or avoided altogether because of the effects these stories have on the
interests of media companies. UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 4 n.13.
“More than one-third of the respondents said that news that hurt the financial
interests of the news organization often or sometimes went unreported while 29%
said that news that adversely affected advertisers often or sometimes went
unreported.” Id.
203. See id. at 7 n.28 (citing a story that reported that “media companies failed to
watchdog the finance industry [because] media conglomerates were involved in the
very same ‘orgy’ of mergers and acquisitions during the late ‘90s”). One
commentator suggested that “had AOL and the Washington Post had common
ownership, the Post may never have reported AOL’s improper accounting practices,
which ultimately ignited an SEC investigation of AOL.” Id. at 7 (citing Alicia Mundy,
Media Under Review, CABLE WORLD, Sept. 16, 2002).
204. Increasing media concentration, by allowing networks to purchase more
stations than ever, currently takes the decision-making power from stations and gives
it to networks. See Rose & Flint, supra note 188 (reporting that station owners, like
Jim Goodman of Capital Broadcasting, are pleading with the FCC to reign in the size
of networks and their ability to overpower affiliates). Networks’ growth allows them
not only to reduce the amount they pay to local affiliates to run their programming,
but in some instances, to actually require the affiliates to pay the networks for
carrying their shows. Id. Networks have also gained the upper hand in preemption
deals. They frequently force local stations to air the shows that the networks prefer,
and that the local stations find offensive to community standards, over local or
“family-friendly” programming. Id.
205. See Ted Turner, Monopoly or Democracy?, WASH. POST, May 30, 2003, at A23
(writing about the dangers of media consolidation).
When you lose small businesses, you lose big ideas. People who own their
own businesses are their own bosses. They are independent thinkers . . . .
[Large media corporations] kill local programming because it’s expensive,
and they push national programming because it’s cheap—even if it runs
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The Commission’s focus on encouraging competition among
media outlets came explicitly from the Telecommunications Act of
206
1996, but has its roots in the principle of viewpoint diversity.
Indeed, the Commission has long found that encouraging a wide
variety of television stations benefits the public interest because a
competitive environment engenders improved service among
207
competitors.
Healthy competition also ensures various viewpoints
on television, which helps advance First Amendment values.
Today, of the 1,248 commercial television stations operating in
2000, over 1,000 are affiliated with one of the seven largest U.S.
208
commercial networks.
The UHF discount provision allows the
largest media companies, which have the greatest purchasing power,
to acquire most of the channels on the air, and thus become large,
209
powerful media conglomerates.
At the same time, the smallest
media companies and independent owners are being shut out of the
210
market by these ever-growing media giants. The outcry against the
Commission’s decision to allow greater broadcast ownership is so
widespread that leaders of some of the biggest companies were
compelled to protest it. Ted Turner, founder of CNN and Chairman
counter to local interests and community values.
Id.
206. See Aarons, supra note 27, at 329-30 (explaining that the 1996
Telecommunications Act further embraced the spirit of deregulation in media that
began in the 1980s, and that the Commission’s shift towards deregulation stemmed
from a desire to encourage the development of new media outlets). According to
Aarons, the Commission reasoned that competition would allow consumers to
choose from a variety of broadcast alternatives, thereby making it unnecessary for the
government to protect the public interest through regulation. Id.
207. See, e.g., 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 10 (“Increasing the
number of television competitors is likely to (1) put pressure on competitors to be
more responsive to the wants and needs of consumers; (2) increase the total amount
of service available to consumers; and (3) increase the diversity of service offered.”).
208. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (noting
that “[o]ver sixty percent of commercial TV stations are affiliated with one of the top
four networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC) . . . [a]nother 19% are affiliated with the
smaller national networks: (United Paramount (UPN), Warner Brothers (WB), and
Paxson Network) . . . [and] [t]he remaining stations are affiliated with other smaller
networks or are independents.”).
209. See Turner, supra note 205 (reporting that the current climate of media
consolidation forced him to sell Turner Broadcasting to Time Warner, and threatens
the survival of small companies).
210. See id.; see also Martin Peers, How Media Giants are Reassembling the Old
Oligopoly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2002, at A1.
Entertainment giants such as Viacom, NBC parent General Electric Co., and
Walt Disney Co., which owns ABC, now reach more than 50% of the
primetime TV audience through their combined broadcast and cable
outlets. The total rises to 80% if you include the parents of newer
networks—such as News Corp.’s Fox and AOL Time Warner Inc.’s WB—and
NBC’s pending acquisitions of Vivendi Universal’s cable assets. . . .
Id.
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of Turner Enterprises, Inc., claims that if the rules approved by the
Commission had existed in 1970, he could not have established
211
He asserts that all of the UHF
Turner Broadcasting or CNN.
stations have been bought, and that even an acquisition of an
available station would not provide an independent owner with the
212
opportunity to succeed.
To compete, Turner states, “you have to
have good programming and good distribution. Today both are
owned by conglomerates that keep the best for themselves and leave
the worst for you—if they sell anything to you at all. It is hard to
213
compete when your suppliers are owned by your competitors.”
In its most recent broadcast review, the Commission chose to
maintain the UHF discount while voting to raise the ownership cap to
214
forty-five percent. By so doing, the Commission turned a blind eye
to the fact that this allows the largest media companies to amass the
215
The media ownership rules
majority of stations on the air.
advanced by the 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review allow one company
to own UHF TV stations in 199 of 210 markets currently existing in
the United States, almost ninety-five percent of U.S. markets, “the
equivalent of owning stations in every television market in the entire
216
country except California.” This is even more troubling when one
considers that maintaining the UHF discount in this new regulatory
environment enables companies like News Corp’s Fox, Viacom’s UPN

211. See Turner, supra note 205 (arguing that the FCC rules that extend the
market dominance of the largest media corporations render it “virtually impossible”
for an independent owner to enter the television market). The theory that
consolidated media ownership eliminates local programming and independent ideas
underlies Turner’s warning against allowing media concentration. Id.
212. See id. (“If a young media entrepreneur were trying to get started today under
these proposed rules, he or she wouldn’t be able to buy a UHF station, as I did.
They’re all bought up.”).
213. Id.
214. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,286,
46,327-28 (maintaining the UHF discount but raising the national ownership cap
from thirty-five percent to forty-five percent); see also Zuckerman, supra note 3
(stating that the FCC’s recent decision will deliver “a body blow to American
democracy,” because the decision allows large media companies “to buy up more TV
stations and newspapers, becoming more powerful and reaping a financial
bonanza”).
215. The UHF discount allows a company to own twice as many UHF as VHF
stations, and there are many more UHF than VHF stations on the air today. See 2002
Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755. Thus, the UHF discount
has allowed companies to obtain a massive number of UHF stations, without
exceeding the national ownership cap.
216. See Zuckerman, supra note 3 (reporting that, due to the new rules, “a single
company could influence the elections for 98 U.S. senators, 382 members of the
House of Representatives, 49 governors, 49 state legislatures, and countless local
races”).
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and AOL Time Warner’s WB to reach ninety percent of the
217
population.
The Commission’s justification for keeping the UHF discount
intact was that it found this rule necessary to promote entry and
218
competition among broadcast networks. Paradoxically, because the
provision effectively raises the national ownership cap, the largest
media companies are making it impossible for smaller networks to
219
enter the field.
The Commission also argues that without this
provision, UHF stations will find themselves back in economically
220
unfavorable situations without networks to support them. However,
the Commission’s findings show that UHF stations are not having any
221
trouble acquiring network affiliation.
The Commission’s plan for the UHF discount conceived in the
2002 Broadcast Review is not logical. It proposes to put off
consideration of a sunset provision for the UHF discount until a
222
transition to Digital Television is near completion.
It asserts that
digital television equalizes UHF and VHF signals by eliminating the
223
However, cable equalizes the UHF and
analog signal altogether.
224
VHF signal just as effectively.
Still, the Commission argues that a
substantial amount of the American public is not a subscriber of
225
To the contrary, over eighty-six percent of American
cable.
households receive television over some kind of cable or satellite
service, and over ninety-seven percent of American households are
226
cable-ready.
It is simply not justifiable to regulate broadcast
217. See id.; see also Owen Gibson, US Plans Radical Revamp of Media Ownership Rules,
GUARDIAN, May 13, 2003 (quoting Gene Kimmelman, director of the Consumer’s
Union, who charges that retaining the UHF discount while raising the national
ownership cap is “total hypocrisy”), available at http://media.guardian.co.uk./city/
story/0,7497,955024,00.html.
218. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, 46,340-41
(claiming that UHF continues to experience a competitive handicap as compared
with VHF).
219. See Turner, supra note 205 (warning that the current level of media
concentration is crippling competition in the broadcast industry).
220. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341.
221. See, e.g., 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule based on evidence that UHF stations have
had remarkable success attracting affiliates without the help of this regulation). In
fact, the 2003 Broadcast Ownership Rules cite statements from Univision and Paxson
detailing their success in affiliating with UHF stations. 2002 Biennial Broadcast
Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341.
222. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341.
223. Id.
224. 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 73-80 (noting the EI Study’s finding that
cable has eliminated the UHF signal disadvantage).
225. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,340-41.
226. See id.; Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,912, 7,912 (Jan. 26, 2001)
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television based on a public interest that ignores all but three percent
of the public.
The Commission must act to eliminate or promptly phase out the
UHF discount, especially given the increase in the national ownership
cap promulgated by the 2002 Broadcast Review, and subsequently,
the Appropriations Act of 2004. Supporters of the provision could
argue that eliminating the UHF discount would disrupt the market at
the expense of owners and consumers because many media entities
would be forced above the thirty-five percent national ownership cap.
However, the Commission’s traditional reluctance to force divestiture
suggests that many current ownership situations would likely be
227
“grandfathered” into the new rules. Indeed, through a 1989 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC requested comments on whether
or not to grandfather ownership relationships that would exceed the
228
rules in the case of UHF discount elimination.
One caveat to this
theory is that, according to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2004, broadcast companies that exceed the new thirty-nine percent
national ownership cap have two years to divest their excess
229
interests. Thus, the Commission could interpret this language in a
way that prompts it to enforce divestiture if and when it decides to
eliminate the UHF discount. Nonetheless, repealing this provision is
the only way to ameliorate the effects of gross media concentration in
the future.
The most effective solution is to eliminate the UHF discount and
encourage divestiture, pursuant to a proposal like Senator McCain’s
230
Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003.
(estimating that homes “passed” by cable, or cable-ready, was 97.1% as of June 2001).
227. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 786-88, 792
(1978) (finding that a small gain in diversity was not enough justification for an
across-the-board divestiture requirement in the cross-ownership restriction rule
because that level of divestiture would cause disruption for the industry and hardship
for individual owners). In the rulemaking that became the subject of this
proceeding, the Commission held that divestiture was warranted only in the most
egregious cases of cross-ownership monopoly. See id. at 787.
228. Id.
229. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, § 629, 118
Stat. 3.
230. See Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003, S. 267, 108th
Cong. § 6(b) (2003). The Minority Media and Telecommunications Council filed
Comments in opposition to the 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Order and a Petition
for Reconsideration, urging the Commission to adopt the “SDB [socially and
economically disadvantaged businesses] Transfer Option” set forth in Senator John
McCain’s proposed Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003. See
Comments of the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, In the Matter of
Broadcast Ownership Omnibus Proceeding, MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 27, 2003)
(on file with the American University Law Review); Petition for Reconsideration of
the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, In the Matter of 2002
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According to this plan, broadcast companies exceeding the national
ownership cap after the UHF discount is eliminated would sell
“clusters” of stations, intact, to socially and economically
disadvantaged businesses (“SDB”). This “SDB Transfer” would
provide a way to keep the largest media companies under the
national ownership cap without disrupting the market by forcing
231
them to break up station groups.
The plan would additionally
benefit minority owners by allowing them to take advantage of the
efficiencies of a pre-created group of stations in a cluster. The
Commission has already made numerous efforts over the past several
232
years to encourage this kind of diversity in broadcast ownership.
This solution is ideal, as it eliminates some of the most egregious
broadcast television concentration while maintaining market
233
efficiencies.
Most importantly, by fostering the growth of
disadvantaged, minority-owned, and female-owned businesses, this
solution also serves the public interest goals of encouraging greater
diversity and competition in the media marketplace.
CONCLUSION
As an agency entrusted to protect the public interest, the
Commission has a duty to create and enforce rules that truly serve the
tenets of its public interest mandate. Without examining market
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rules and
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local
Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not
Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, MB Docket Nos. 02-277, 03-130, MM Docket
Nos. 01-235, 01-317, 00-244 (Sept. 4, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
231. See Letter from David Honig, Executive Director, Minority Media and
Telecommunications Council, to Michael Powell, Kathleen Abernathy, Jonathan
Adelstein, Michael Copps, and Kevin Martin, Commissioners, Federal
Communications Commission 3 (May 27, 2003) (on file with the American
University Law Review) (urging the FCC to adopt the SDP Transfer plan).
232. See In the Matter of Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387, ¶
5 (1992) (concluding that encouraging investment in small businesses and minority
broadcasters is a worthy goal). Chairman Sikes proposed a plan to allow those who
incubated minority-owned companies to acquire additional stations beyond the
ownership caps. Id. ¶ 6; see also 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra
note 9, at ¶¶ 50-53 (expressing hope that the Commission’s national ownership rules
will also encourage minority ownership).
233. S. 267 § 2(a). Although this bill contemplates that the Treasury Department
would be responsible for conducting a rulemaking to determine which groups, like
Hispanics or women, are socially and economically disadvantaged in the
telecommunications industries, the Commission could also engage in its own case-bycase determination of eligible small or minority-owned businesses to find the best
buyers for these clusters. Id.
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data, it is easy to believe that the Commission is abiding by these
mandates and regulating communications consistent with its own
findings. By maintaining an outdated provision like the UHF
discount, especially in the face of an increased national ownership
cap, the Commission is choosing instead to eviscerate the priciples
that founded its creation in 1934. The FCC must give broadcast
television back to the people. The best way to do this is to eliminate
the UHF discount and distribute media interests to a diversity of
owners. While the Congress of 1934 could never have envisioned the
technologies and variety in today’s media, it would wholeheartedly
support any plan that would ensure that the American public has
234
airwaves “of, by, and for the people.”

234. Statement of Commissioner Michael Copps, dissenting, Regarding the 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, at
23 (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/
DOC-235047A9.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).

